No. 84-1901.United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.Argued January 7, 1985.
Decided June 6, 1985.
Page 645
Bryan Jay Yolles, Washington, D.C. (Robert A. Altman, Philip H. Hecht, Clifford Warnke, Washington, D.C., Terrence Ney, James M. Lewis, Boothe, Prichard Dudley, Fairfax, Va., Warren T. Braham, Senior Vice President, First American Bank of Va., on brief), for petitioner.
Thomas L. Ray, Asst. Gen. Counsel Litigation, Washington, D.C. (Richard B. Dyson, Acting Gen. Counsel, Barry L. Molar, Civil Aeronautics Bd., J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., John J. Powers, III and Frederic Freilicher, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on brief), for respondent.
(John J. Gill, Michael F. Crotty, Washington, D.C., John W. Edmonds, III, Mays, Valentine, Davenport Moore, Richmond, Va., on brief), for amici curiae.
Before HALL, ERVIN and SNEEDEN, Circuit Judges.
ERVIN, Circuit Judge:
[1] The petitioner, First American Bank of Virginia (“First American”), seeks reversal of Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) Order 84-8-40 rendered on August 9, 1984.[1] The Order reversed the CAB’s Chief Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding in his Initial Decision that First American complied with all applicable CAB charter regulations as the depository bank for charter flights operated by Davis Agency, Inc. (“Davis”) in 1982. In short, the Board found that by not adequately monitoring Davis’ deposits of charter participants’ funds, First American violated CAB charter regulations. Consequently, the Board assessed First American $30,000 in civil penalties. [2] On appeal, we are first presented with the argument of amici curiae[2] that the CAB did not have jurisdiction to assess civil penalties against First American under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) (“FAA”). Second, First American contends that the Board’s order reversing the ALJ’s findings was based on an erroneous interpretation of the CAB’s charter regulations. Because we conclude that the Board’s order placed a higher standard of care on First American to safeguard charter fund deposits than is required under the CAB’s own regulations and applicable state law, we reverse and direct the Board to adopt the ALJ’s decision. [3] To protect the public from unscrupulous travel agencies, the CAB’s charter regulations require a tour operator to file a prospectus with the Board before selling or advertising a charter flight. 14 C.F.R. § 380.25 (1984). The CAB requires the charter prospectus to include: (1) a proposed charter flight schedule; (2) a statement that the tour operator has entered into a depository agreement with an air carrier and a depository bank; and (3) a statement indicating that the depository bank has received a copy of the tour operator’s proposed charter flight schedule. Id. § 380.28. More important, the CAB’s charter regulations also require a tour operator to make various financial arrangements to ensure that charter participants’ funds are adequately protected whenever a charter program is cancelled by a tour operator. One such financial arrangement is the CAB’s requirement that a tour operatorPage 646
enter into a depository agreement with an airline and a depository bank. Id. § 380.34(b)(2). These depository agreements specifically require a tour operator (such as Davis) to deposit charter participants’ funds into a depository bank Id. Once deposited, the depository bank is required to maintain a separate accounting for all funds deposited by each charter group. Id. § 380.34(b)(2)(VII).
[4] In 1977, the CAB proposed amending its charter regulations to impose more substantial, affirmative duties upon depository banks. See 42 Fed.Reg. 61,408, 61,411, 61,412, 61,415 (1977). Pertinent to this case, the Board proposed a requirement that depository banks report any knowledge they might have concerning violations of charter regulations by tour operators. Id. at 61,145. In addition, the CAB solicited comments on whether the Board should promulgate a rule to prohibit depository banks from accepting checks representing charter participants’ payments that are not payable to the bank. Id. at 61,412. [5] The public comments filed with the Board criticized the proposed regulations for effectively requiring depository banks to ensure that tour operators fully complied with the charter regulations. Consistent with this critical view, one bank commented:[6] Comments of Barclays Bank of California, CAB Docket 31735 (June 27, 1978). Responding to this criticism, the Board deleted those sections of the proposed charter regulations that placed additional, affirmative duties on depository banks to oversee regulatory compliance by tour operators. See 44 Fed.Reg. 12, 971 (1979). [7] To assist tour operators in their attempts to comply with charter regulations, the CAB has published an information packet which describes the procedures for filing a charter program under the Board’s regulations. That information packet contains a sample depository agreement intended to provide tour operators with an easy manner of compliance. The sample depository agreement forms also expressly provide that each agreement is governed by and construed under applicable state law. Each depository agreement entered into by First American and Davis for the 1982 charter season was based on the CAB’s sample form agreement.The CAB’s proposed regulations sought to place an affirmative duty of inquiry on the bank as to the fulfillment of the charterer’s or direct air carrier’s obligations, something well beyond the usual functions of an escrow holder. The bank has no control over the terms of the charter’s and air carrier’s arrangements and is not likely to have actual knowledge of how those terms are being carried out.
I. [8] Factual Background
[9] Davis is a travel agency that operates charter programs for flights between the United States and various destinations in Europe. To comply with the CAB’s charter regulations, Davis established depository escrow accounts for charter participants’ funds at First American and its predecessor bank, Clarendon Bank Trust Company, between May, 1977 and January, 1982. During this period, these escrow accounts were apparently maintained by First American without any irregularities or violations of the charter regulations. Because of a change in management, however, Davis began to experience serious administrative and managerial difficulties in early 1982. Most prominent among the problems resulting from this managerial change was Davis’ misdeposit of funds intended for various escrow accounts into its own general commercial account at First American.
Page 647
were received; (2) there were no funds in the Pan Am escrow account; and (3) First American had not received payment requests from any charter air carrier since at least 1979 in accordance with Davis’ regular practice of paying air carriers directly from its own funds, rather than from charter participants’ funds deposited into escrow accounts at First American. Due to Pan Am’s unexpected payment request, First American immediately
questioned Davis to determine why Pan Am had sent the certificates directly to First American. Davis informed First American that the certificates requesting payment had been inadvertently and mistakenly sent by Pan Am to First American. According to the ALJ, “Davis officials assured the Bank that there was no problem and that there simply had been a misunderstanding by Pan Am.” (JA 71).
Page 648
relationship with Davis on August 11, 1982.[3]
II. [15] The Proceedings Below
[16] On January 27, 1983, the CAB filed a complaint against First American alleging that by “repeatedly permitt[ing] charter participants’ funds to be deposited” by Davis into non-escrow accounts, First American violated the CAB’s charter regulations under 14 C.F.R. § 380.34(b)(Q) (1984). The complaint further asserted that “by late April 1982” First American “knew or should have known” that Davis had misdeposited charter participants’ funds into nonescrow accounts.[4]
[T]he Bank should have acted promptly to find out where the missing funds were and to recover them. In addition, since Davis had commercial accounts at the Bank, the Bank should have begun examining at least a sample of Davis’ commercial deposits to see if charter payments were included in those deposits.
. . . We agree that the Bank’s handling of the escrow accounts after June 15 was praiseworthy, but the Bank took too few steps to enforce the escrow requirements in the preceding two months, despite its knowledge that Davis was not following escrow requirements.
Page 649
[20] (JA 360) (emphasis added). Consequently, the Board reversed the ALJ’s Initial Decision and assessed First American substantial civil penalties. III. [21] The CAB Properly Exercised Jurisdiction
[22] Amici curiae argue that First American could not possibly have violated the CAB’s charter regulations “because the rules of the [CAB] by their own terms, do not apply to banks, and by statute cannot be made to apply to banks.” (Brief of Amici Curiae at 6). As a result, they assert that the CAB lacked jurisdiction to assess civil penalties against First American for any violations of its charter regulations. We disagree.
[24] Id. This provision of the FAA is merely an exhaustion of remedies requirement designed to ensure that administrative “‘problems have been fully aired and focused in the proceedings below.”‘ Cohen v. CAB, 657 F.2d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting Air Line Pilots Association International v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972, 95 S.Ct. 1391, 43 L.Ed.2d 652 (1975)); see also Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Section 1486(e) of the FAA does not, therefore, preclude appellate consideration of a jurisdictional question not contested before the CAB because “a reviewing court may consider a challenge to an agency’s power or jurisdiction even if it was not raised before the agency.”Railroad Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 721 F.2d 1332, 1338No objection to an order of the Board shall be considered by the courts unless such an objection shall have been urged before the Board or if it was not so urged, unless there were reasonable grounds for the failure to do so.
n. 19 (D.C. Cir. 1983); accord Washington Association for Television and Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 682 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 499 n. 5, 82 S.Ct. 1432, 1443 n. 5, 8 L.Ed.2d 639
(1962) (Brennan, J., concurring). As a consequence, we have the power to consider whether the CAB had jurisdiction to assess First American civil penalties. [25] Simply put, the argument that the CAB has the authority only to regulate air carriers and not banks under the FAA is unpersuasive. By providing that “[a]ny person who violates any provision . . . of this Act, or any rule, regulation, or order issued thereunder . . . shall be subject to a civil penalty,” the FAA grants the CAB broad enforcement powers that are not limited to air carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982); accord CAB v. Tour Travel Enterprises, 440 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (N.D.Ill. 1977) vacated on other grounds, 605 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1979) (“Section 1487(a) does not limit the Board’s enforcement powers to air carriers.”). The Seventh Circuit has already rejected the argument that depository banks are beyond the CAB’s regulatory powers on the ground that
[26] Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 229 (7th Cir. 1978) vacated, 443 U.S. 903, 99 S.Ct. 3094, 61 L.Ed.2d 871 (1979) aff’d on rehearing, 635 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S.Ct. 939, 67 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981). [27] Manifestly, “Congress envisioned that [charter passengers] were to be protected from air travel abuses by means of the [depository] bank’s adherence to federal regulations.” Id. We refuse to frustratea reading of both the statute and the Special Charter Regulations [reveals] that the use of a depository bank . . . was a contemplated and necessary element in effectuating the stated purpose of providing for proper security under strict controls . . . . [A bank] cannot escape its federally enforceable duties on the grounds that it is not specifically mentioned in the statute which enabled the CAB to regulate as it did.
Page 650
that clear congressional goal by unduly limiting the CAB’s regulatory and enforcement powers to air carriers alone. Such a strained interpretation of the FAA would seriously hamper the CAB’s regulatory attempts to protect charter passengers from flight cancellation without reimbursement by their tour operator. Limiting regulation to charter tour operators cannot accomplish the CAB’s goal of adequately protecting charter passenger funds in the event of cancellation. We are firmly convinced, therefore, that the CAB had jurisdiction to regulate depository banks and assess First American civil penalties for the violation of its regulations.
IV. [28] First American’s Compliance With The CAB’s Charter Regulations
[29] The Board asserts that First American had an affirmative duty under the CAB’s charter regulations to monitor Davis’ deposits after receiving constructive notice that something was amiss with the Pan Am account on April 15, 1982. We cannot agree and instead conclude that First American’s conduct after April 15th under the Board’s regulations was both reasonable and proper.
[31] 3 A Michie’s Jurisprudence: Banks and Banking: § 58 (1976) (emphasis added). [32] Similarly, the rule in New York is that a depository bank is “under no duty to exercise vigilance to protect the trust estate from possible embezzlement.” Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co.,Every time the word trustee, agent, or executor appears upon a check or draft, it is not the duty of the bank to make inquiry. To place the burden of supervising all such accounts upon a bank of deposit would be unreasonable, and one of which few institutions, if any, would be willing to assume . . . . [W]hen the bank has no actual or constructive notice of fraud or misdoing on the part of the fiduciary, who is one of its depositors, if the bank, acting in good faith, merely credits the personal account of the fiduciary with the checks, this does not make the bank liable if the fiduciary afterwards misappropriates the deposit. In order to render a bank liable for misappropriation by a fiduciary of a trust fund deposited in the bank, the bank must have actually participated therein, or, with knowledge, reaped some benefit therefrom, such as receiving it in payment of the indebtedness of the fiduciary to the bank.
Page 651
287 N.Y. 94, 102, 38 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1941). Further, depository banks are entitled to presume that the trustee will apply all trust funds exclusively to their trust purposes despite their initial deposit into a personal account. Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N.Y. 106, 111, 112 N.E. 759, 760
(1916). Therefore, it is clear under state law that unless a depository bank actually participates in or reaps some benefit from a fiduciary’s misappropriation of funds, the bank is not liable.
Page 652
of a duty that its own regulations neither contemplated nor established. Although a regulation requiring depository banks to monitor charter deposits may be desirable and salutary, we cannot retroactively impose such a duty.[7] That duty must await another day and another regulation.
[37] First American’s conduct was entirely reasonable and proper under the CAB’s charter regulations. Accordingly, we reverse and direct the Board to enter an order affirming the ALJ’s Initial Decision. [38] REVERSED.(1) The depository bank must acknowledge its liability to participants for any losses attributable to the bank’s failure to comply with any of the applicable regulations.
42 Fed.Reg. 61, 411 (1977).
(2) The depository bank is prohibited from accepting payments `in the escrow account’ that are not made payable to the bank. The bank must return improperly drafted payments to their makers.
Id. at 61, 412.
(3) The depository bank must report any violation of the Board’s charter rules of which it `has knowledge.’
Id. at 61, 412.
These proposed regulations plainly place upon depository banks the very duty that the CAB now argues already exists under current regulations. If that is indeed the case, there would have been no reason for the CAB to have proposed any regulatory changes. We cannot believe that the CAB’s proposed regulations were utterly superfluous.
(S.D.Fla. 1984); United States v. Sanchez 520 F. Supp. 1038, 1040
(S.D.Fla. 1981), aff’d mem., 703 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1983). Where civil penalties may be imposed, therefore, “individuals and organizations [must] be specifically put on notice of [possible] government sanctions before they are levied.” United States v. Rust Communications Group, Ins., 425 F. Supp. 1029, 1033
(E.D.Va. 1976). The requirement of notice is principally designed to give fair warning to persons or organizations subject to administrative sanctions. Regarding the requirement of adequate notice, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “statutes and regulations which allow monetary penalties against those who violate them, . . . must give . . . fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires, and it must provide a reasonably clear standard of culpability to circumscribe the discretion of the enforcing authority and its agents.” Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649
(5th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted); accord Montgomery Ward Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1332 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Metro-East Mfg. Co., 655 F.2d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 1981). Because civil penalties could be imposed, the need for clarity in the CAB’s charter regulations was greater than in the usual case where no such sanction is available. First American was entitled to clear notice of any duty it supposedly had under the charter regulations to monitor Davis’ deposits. That notice was never provided.