No. 79-1273.United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.Argued February 7, 1980.
Decided May 9, 1980.
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Freddi Lipstein, Appellate Staff, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (John C. Oldenburg, U.S. Postal Service, Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Thomas E. Lydon, Jr., U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., Robert E. Kopp, Appellate Staff, Civ. Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellant.
James L. Bell, Columbia, S.C. (Deborah Wright, Columbia, S.C., on brief), for appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge and ROSZEL C. THOMSEN, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
JAMES DICKSON PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
[1] William F. Bolger, as Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, appeals the entry of a preliminary injunction preventing the Postal Service from implementing certain changes at the Columbia, South Carolina Post Office pending arbitration. Because we conclude that federal injunctive relief was not necessary to protect the arbitral process that was available to resolve the underlying labor dispute in this case, we reverse and vacate the injunctive decree. I
[2] At the times in issue the Columbia Post Office handled both preferential mail — first class and air mail — and non-preferential mail — bulk rate and other low priority mail. In recent years, however, the Postal Service had been transferring the processing of non-preferential mail from local post offices to regional bulk mail centers. By the end of 1978, a substantial volume of the nonpreferential mail had been transferred from Columbia to the bulk mail center in Greensboro, North Carolina, so that eight of the twenty-two employees in the second shift of the Columbia Post Office’s non-preferential mail section were no longer needed.
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management desisted. Despite this, management shortly thereafter exercised its power under the national agreement “to hire, promote, transfer, assign and retain employees in positions within the Postal Service” to transfer the remaining employees in the non-preferential shift into newly created positions in other sections, while retaining the non-preferential shift on paper. This move was designed to allow the continued transfer of bulk mail operations to Greensboro and the transfer there of equipment used for bulk mail processing.
[4] The Local filed a grievance under the mandatory grievance-arbitration provision in the national agreement and sought this injunction to halt the proposed management action pending the result of arbitration. In granting preliminary injunctive relief the district court applied a standard “balance of hardship” equitable analysis and found the balance to weigh in favor of the plaintiff. We believe that this mode of analysis failed properly to take into account special considerations controlling the exercise of federal judicial power in arbitrable labor disputes and resulted in an erroneous exercise of that power. II
[5] The controlling principle is that where, as here, a collective bargaining agreement provides for mandatory grievance-arbitration procedures, the federal courts should not intrude at the behest of either management or labor into disputes over arbitrable issues unless intrusion by injunction is necessary to protect the arbitral process itself.
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arbitrator’s award, Greyhound was inapposite:
[10] Id. at 123.[1]An injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration may be issued either against a company or against a union in an appropriate Boys Markets case where it is necessary to prevent conduct by the party enjoined from rendering the arbitral process a hollow formality in those instances where, as here, the arbitral award when rendered could not return the parties substantially to the status quo ante.
III
[11] Under these authorities the appropriate test for issuance of injunction in the instant case is whether the conduct proposed must be enjoined because the available arbitral process could not possibly restore the status quo ante in an acceptable form were that conduct to be found violative of contract rights. This would render the arbitral process a hollow formality and necessitate injunction maintaining the status quo pending arbitration.
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